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ARTICLE
NEW TRENDS IN PARTIES’ OPTIONS TO
SELECT THE APPLICABLE LAW?
THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ANDREAS SCHWARTZE*
INTRODUCTION
In a cross-border contract with connections to at least two legal orders,
the parties are able to choose the law that courts or arbitrators have to apply
to the contract—an option which is possible under nearly all conflict of law
rules in the world.1 Parallel to the freedom to determine the content of the
contract2—and as a variation of the general idea of the freedom of individu-
als3—choice of law is a part of the principle of private autonomy, a princi-
ple that Christian Kirchner has emphasized as the instrument for any person
* Dr. Andreas Schwartze, LL.M. (EUI), full professor and chair of European Private Law,
Comparative Law and Private International Law at the University of Innsbruck, Austria.
1. See, e.g., Symeon C, Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for Interna-
tional Contracts: Some Preliminary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 873, 875 (2013) (pointing
only to Latin America as an exception).
2. In contrast to the freedom to conclude a contract, that is, if the contract exists at all and
with whom. See generally Principle 3: Freedom of contract the starting point, in PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFER-
ENCE, 62 (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_
outline_edition_en.pdf [hereinafter DCFR] (“. . . should be free to decide whether or not to con-
tract and with whom to contract”) and Art. II.-1:102 DCFR, which is nearly identical to Art. 1.1 of
the UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2010), http://www.uni
droit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/blackletter2010-english.pdf [hereinafter
PICC].
3. JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 296 (6th ed. 2006); Peter von
Wilmowsky, EG-Vertrag und kollisionsrechtliche Rechtswahlfreiheit, 62 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
F ¨UR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 1, 3 (1998); see generally Ju¨rgen
Basedow, Theorie der Rechtswahl oder Parteiautonomie als Grundlage des Internationalen
Privatrechts, 75 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT
32, 50, 54 (2011).
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to organize his life in his own responsibility,4 basing it not only on the
methodological individualism of traditional Economic Analysis of Law but
also on the normative individualism of New Institutional Economics.5 From
an economic perspective,6 choice of law supports a contractual market solu-
tion aiming at the common benefit of both parties.7
But most private international law norms prescribe different ways to
exercise choice of law and create various limits of the so-called “party au-
tonomy.”8 Similar to substantive contract law,9 this freedom of the parties is
restricted. The restriction is justified mainly by national objectives,10 in rare
cases by the public policy exception,11 a bit more often based on interna-
tional mandatory rules,12 and regularly concerning special areas of contract
law to protect the weaker party.13 But these restrictions are not tackled by
the Hague Principles on Choice of Law. To invoke overriding mandatory
4. Christian Kirchner & Andreas Schwartze, Recht, in LEXIKON DER WIRTSCHAFTSETHIK
876, 878 (G. Enderle, et al. eds., 1993).
5. See, e.g., Christian Kirchner, Die o¨konomische Theorie, in EUROP ¨AISCHE
METHODENLEHRE 132, 151 (Karl Riesenhuber ed., 2010).
6. For information concerning the highlighted normative individualism in this field, see
Christian Kirchner, An Economic Analysis of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Clauses, in AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Ju¨rgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono
eds., 2006).
7. GIESELA R ¨UHL, STATUT UND EFFIZIENZ ¨OKONOMISCHE GRUNDLAGEN ZUM INTERNATION-
ALEN PRIVATRECHT 347, 351 (2011) (pointing out that the competition between different legal
orders is being animated and discussing regulatory competition); see also Kirchner, supra note 6,
at 47 .
8. On the history of this concept, see Peter Nygh, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS 3 (1999).
9. See ANDREAS SCHWARTZE, EUROP ¨AISCHE SACHM ¨ANGELGEW ¨AHRLEISTUNG BEIM
WARENKAUF 595 (2000); Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy in International Contracts and
the Multiple Ways of Slicing the Apple, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1128 (2014).
10. Symeonides, supra note 9, at 1136; Daniel Girsberger, Die Haager Prinzipien u¨ber die
Rechtswahl in internationalen kommerziellen Vertra¨gen, 24 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR
INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPAISCHES RECHT 545, 548 (2014).
11. See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), arts. 9, 21, 2008 O.J. L 177
(EU) [hereinafter Rome I]. From 1988 to 2010, only twenty-six decisions from four member states
(Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Greece) were justified by the public policy exception. See
UNALEX DATABASE http://www.unalex.eu/Judgment/JudgmentSearch.aspx. Compare RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90, with Laws Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Rela-
tions of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 5 (China) [hereinafter Chinese PIL
Statute], and Act on the General Rules of Application of Laws, Law No. 10 of 1898 (amended
2006), art. 42 (Japan) [hereinafter Japanese PIL Act].
12. See Rome I, Art. 9. For the Chinese private international law, see Gan Yong, Mandatory
Rules in Private International Law in the People’s Republic of China, 13 Y.B. OF PRIVATE INT’L
L. 305 (2012/2013).
13. In some fields, choice of law is channelized to certain legal systems, e.g., carried persons,
Rome I, supra note 11, at art. 5(2), or policyholders, id. at art. 7(3). For consumers, compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2), and Rome I, supra note 11, at art. 6(2),
with Chinese PIL Statute, supra note 11, at art. 42, and Japanese PIL Act, supra note 11, at art. 11.
For employees, compare Rome I, supra note 11, at art. 8(1), with Chinese PIL Statute, supra note
11, at art. 43, and Japanese PIL Act, supra note 11, at art. 12.
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rules or to refer to the ordre public is still possible under Article 11 of the
Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Contracts (PCLIC),14
and the areas of consumer or employment contracts are completely ex-
empted by Article 1(1) sentence 2 of the PCLIC. However, other restric-
tions from domestic law are result from differing acceptance of the ways to
choose a legal order, and in this regard standardization via the Hague Prin-
ciples could be helpful. It will be analyzed in this study if this is the case.
All these national restrictions affect legal certainty, a very relevant aim
of choice of law,15 because the parties cannot be sure that the law they have
chosen is applied. The choice of law is up to the private international law of
the state in which a court adjudicates their legal dispute, following the prin-
ciple that the conflict of law rules are those of the lex fori.16 Just to make
international contract litigation more complicated, consider the following:
because the contracting parties often also have the option to choose the
forum of their legal dispute—and through this indirectly the applicable
choice of law rules17—they may reduce the uncertainty about the effective-
ness of their choice of law, at least if the actors are informed enough about
the features of the private international law of the forum.
To largely remove the differences between conflict of laws regimes
regarding choice of law and the connected legal uncertainties leading to
high expenses for information and significant transaction costs,18 an inter-
national unification of choice of law rules similar to the UN-Sales Law
14. See Thomas Pfeiffer, Die Haager Prinzipien des Internationalen Vertragsrechts, 501,
509, in FESTSCHRIFT F ¨UR ULRICH MAGNUS (Peter Mankowski. & Wolfgang Wurmnest eds., 2014).
15. von Wilmovsky, supra note 3, at 4; KROPHOLLER, supra note 3, at 297; Peter Mankow-
ski, Europa¨isches Internationales Privat- und Prozessrecht im Lichte der o¨konomischen Analyse,
in VEREINHEITLICHUNG UND DIVERSIT ¨AT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT-
SR ¨AUMEN: BEITR ¨AGE ZUM VIII. TRAVEM ¨UNDER SYMPOSIUM ZUR ¨OKONOMISCHEN ANALYSE DES
RECHTS  118, 124 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd. Scha¨fer eds., 2002); Georg Kodek, Praktische und
theoretische Anforderungen an die Rechtswahl, in RECHTSWAHL – GRENZEN UND CHANCEN 85, 89
(Bea Verschraegen ed., 2010); see also Dietmar Czernich, Die Rechtswahl im o¨sterreichischen
internationalen Vertragsrecht, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR EUROPARECHT, INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-
TRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 157, 158 (2013); Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy in
Rome I and II From a Comparative Perspective, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW – LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 513, 536 (Katharina Boele-Woelki, Talia
Einhorn, Daniel Girsberger & Symeon Symeonides eds., 2010); Chen Weizuo, Chinese Private
International Law Statute of 28 October 2010, 12 Y.B. OF PRIVATE INT’L L. 27, 38 (2010) (“. . .
the Chinese legislator has paid great attention to legal certainty and predictability . . .”).
16. See Girsberger, supra note 10, at 545; see generally BERND VON HOFFMANN & KARSTEN
THORN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 10 (2007).
17. These could lead to substantive provisions that are favorable to a party even without a
choice of law agreement. See Andreas Schwartze, Internationales Forum Shopping mit Blick auf
das gu¨nstigste Sachrecht, in GRENZEN ¨UBERWINDEN – PRINZIPIEN BEWAHREN, FESTSCHRIFT F ¨UR
BERND VON HOFFMANN 415–23 (2011).
18. For discussion concerning similar findings with regard to the substantive law of contract,
see ANDREAS SCHWARTZE, EUROP ¨AISCHE SACHM ¨ANGELGEW ¨AHRLEISTUNG BEIM WARENKAUF 5
(2000).
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(CISG)19 or to the UNIDROIT-Principles of International Commercial
Contracts (PICC)20 in the area of substantive law, would be suitable. There-
fore, the Hague Conference on Private International Law21, acting in favor
of a worldwide standardization of conflict of laws, has—after an interrupted
attempt to regulate all of the rules of Private International Law in the area
of contract, including the objective connecting factors at the beginning of
the 1980s22—taken up only the issue of choice of law related to contracts in
2006 and had submitted a proposal for “Hague Principles on Choice of Law
in International Contracts”23 (PCLIC) in 2012, which was slightly revised
in July 201424 by the Council of General Affairs of the Hague Conference.
On March 19, 2015, the final version of the Hague Principles25 was
approved.
Below, I will describe several differences between the rules governing
choice of law in contracts contained in the Hague Principles and in some
selected currently applicable conflict of law instruments, such as the Rome
I Regulation of the European Union26 or recent national codifications like
the Chinese PIL statute27 or the Japanese PIL Act.28 On that basis I will
examine whether the attempt to unify choice of law worldwide is improving
legal certainty for the parties. This study concentrates on the content of the
Hague Principles, leaving aside their basic form as non-binding recommen-
dations mainly for national and international legislators.29
19. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, 1989 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-
book.pdf.
20. PICC, supra note 2.
21. For further details concerning this organization, see, e.g., Rolf Wagner, Die Bedeutung
der Haager Konferenz fu¨r Internationales Privatrecht fu¨r die internationale Zusammenarbeit in
Zivilsachen, 12 JURA 891, 891–96 (2011).
22. Hans van Loon, Feasibility Study on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Session, Prel. Doc. E, Tome I, 98–113 (1984). A future resumption
of the work to unify the rules to determine the law governing the contract without a choice of law
is announced, see Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council of General Affairs and
Policy of the Conference, Conclusions and Recommendations, 2 (Apr. 2010), http://www.hcch
.net/upload/wop/genaff2010concl_e.pdf, but is assessed with scepticism, Symeon Symeonides,
The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Preliminary Com-
ments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 877 (2013).
23. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Draft Principles as Approved by the
November 2012 Special Commission Meeting on Choice of Law in International Contracts and
Recommendations for the Commentary (Nov. 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/contracts
2012principles_e.pdf.
24. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Revised Prel. Doc. 6 (July 2014), http://
www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2014pd06rev_en.pdf.
25. Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts (approved
Mar. 19, 2015), https://www.hcch.net/de/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135 [hereinafter
PCLIC].
26. Rome I, supra note 11.
27. Chinese PIL Statute, supra note 11.
28. Japanese PIL Act, supra note 11.
29. PCLIC, supra note 25, at Preamble § 2. For an extensive analysis, see Andreas
Schwartze, Weltweit einheitliche Standards fu¨r die Wahl des Vertragsstatuts – Anwendung-
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I. MAIN FEATURES OF THE HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW
There are some aspects of choice of law regulated in the Hague Princi-
ples that are not fully in line with all or even most of the actual private
international law norms. First, the freedom of choice should be as unlimited
as possible, for example, concerning the time of the choice, the range of the
selectable legal systems,30 and even the type of legal rules by including
non-state standards.31 Second, the parties’ agreement on the choice should
be as predictable as possible, therefore requirements for implied or tacit
choices are necessary32 and choices via standard terms need special treat-
ment.33 The third aspect is that the choice the parties have agreed on should
be respected as much as possible and therefore its replacement by overrid-
ing mandatory provisions or based on arguments of public policy, like in
the United States under sections 90 and 187 of the Restatement Second,34
should be marginal.35 This last aspect will not be discussed in this article.
A. Aspects of a Less Limited Choice of Law
1. Timing of the Choice
The Hague Principles state that the choice of the applicable law “may
be made or modified at any time.”36 A very similar phrase is used in Art.
3(2) sentence 1 of Rome I,37 and like the EU rule, the Hague provision
seems to open the possibility for the parties to agree on the application of a
certain legal system even after the beginning of legal proceedings (as is
currently possible in China38 and in Japan39). Such a late choice of law is
schancen und Anwendungsbereich der Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Con-
tracts, in FESTSCHRIFT ZU EHREN VON CHRISTIAN KIRCHNER 315–32 (Wulf Kaal, Matthias
Schmidt & Andreas Schwartze eds., 2014); see Dieter Martiny, Die Haager Principles on Choice
of Law in International Commercial Contracts, 79 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 624, 631 (2015); Benedicte Fauvarque-Cosson, New Principles in
the Legal World: The Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Commercial Con-
tracts, in ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL LAW 455, 459
(Louise Gullifer & Stefan Vogenauer eds., 2014).
30. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 2 §§ (2), (3).
31. Id. at art. 3.
32. Id. at art. 4.
33. Id. at art. 6 § (1)(b).
34. If “contravening a fundamental policy of a state that has a greater interest in applying its
law . . .”.
35. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 11. See generally supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text.
36. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 2 § (3) sentence 1.
37. The language is that they “may at any time agree.” Nearly the same expression exists in
Switzerland’s Federal Statute on Private International Law, art. 116(3) sentence 1 IPRG-CH: “Die
Rechtswahl kann jederzeit getroffen oder gea¨ndert werden” [The choice of law may be made or
changed at any time].
38. For the official interpretation of the Chinese PIL Statute by the Supreme Peoples Court,
see Knut Benjamin Pissler, Das neue Internationale Privatrecht der Volksrepublik China: Nach
den Steinen tastend den Fluss u¨berqueren, 76 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 3, 31 (2012).
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often made either because the parties only then realize that there is the op-
tion for a choice of law or because the court is assuming an implied vote for
a certain legal order.40 To avoid the homeward trend of courts applying the
legal norms with which they are familiar, some states prohibit a conclusive
choice of law, like Austria.41 The drafters of the Hague Principles omit that
problem, but they generally do not want to extend the effects of the unifica-
tion of conflicts of law to procedural issues (the same could be said of the
U.S. Restatement42). Therefore, the rules of procedure of the forum may
decide upon the question of whether the choice of law in front of a court or
an arbitral tribunal is valid.43 Under the Rome I Regulation, most authors
argue that the private international law of the forum alone has to decide that
question, leaving only problems of proof to the procedural provisions.44
This solution is favorable because opening the door to decisions based on
rules of procedure would endanger the predictability of which law will be
applied on the parties’ contract, since national court proceedings are not
unified and therefore difficult to survey. Finally, the parties should be free
to choose the law, even during litigation, if this will not burden the court
with additional costs.
2. Available Legal Orders
The Hague Principles do not require any connection “between the law
chosen and the parties or their transaction.”45 The same is true for the
choice of law under the Rome I-Regulation,46 although this is not explicitly
clear in the wording of Article 3. In contrast to Rome III47 or the EU Suc-
cession Regulation,48 there is no limitation on choice of certain legal sys-
tems.49 That “freedom of choice”50 gives the parties the chance to opt for a
39. See Yoshiaki Sakurada & Eva Schwittek, The Reform of Japanese Private International
Law, 76 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 89, 104
(2012).
40. Stefan Leible in NOMOS KOMMENTAR BGB, art. 3 Rom I-VO rec. 62 (Barbara Dauner-
Lieb, Thomas Heidel & Gerhard Ring, eds, 2014).
41. Austrian Federal Statute on Private International Law, at § 11 (2) IPRG-AT.
42. Symeonides, supra note 15, at 513, 537.
43. See commentary on Art. 2(3) PCLIC, no. 2.13.
44. See Leible, supra note 40; for discussion in favor of a choice of law in the course of
proceedings, see Francesca Ragno, The Law Applicable to Consumer Contracts under the Rome I
Regulation, in ROME I REGULATION, art. 3 rec. 46 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2015); BEA VERSCHRAEGEN,
RUMMEL ABGB, art. 3 EV ¨U rec. 23 (2004).
45. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 2 § (4).
46. Ragno, supra note 44, at art. 3 rec. 26; Leible, supra note 40, at rec. 23; VERSCHRAEGEN,
supra note 44, at art. 3 EV ¨U rec. 16.
47. Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the
Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation, 2010 O.J. L 343, p. 10 (hereinafter Rome III).
48. Regulation (EU) No 650/2012, On Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and En-
forcement of Decisions and Acceptance and Enforcement of Authentic Instruments in Matters of
Succession and on the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession, 2010 O.J. L 201, p. 107.
49. The same is true for Article 41, sentence 1 of the Chinese PIL Act, supra note 11, see
Pissler, supra note 38, at 32, and of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law, supra
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neutral law, e.g., if they cannot come to a consensus on a certain law or if
they want to use a law that is more suitable for their type of transaction.51
This “expansive concept of party autonomy”52 is rejected by the U.S. con-
flict of law rules because they do not accept a chosen law that has “no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction” if there is “no other
reasonable basis for the parties’ choice.”53 But this requirement is easily
met54 because it should only prevent a choice of law for fully domestic
transactions.55 Arguably, the parties usually know best what is the most
adequate legal environment for their relationship. Therefore, they should be
free to choose any law they like without being forced to show any special
link to the agreed legal system. This is even more necessary to foster the
competition of legal systems by increasing the number of potential
competitors56
3. Choice of Non-State Law
The most controversial feature of the Hague Principles is the option for
the parties to choose a regulation that is not produced by a sovereign state—
called “rules of law” in the Principles (even in the title of Article 3 of the
PCLIC).57 This also seems to be possible in China for international agree-
ments or international usages, even if this is not obvious from the words of
section 3 of the PIL Statute of 2011.58 Now, in the published version of the
Hague Principles,59 the use of non-state rules is limited to those rules that
“are generally accepted on an international, supranational or regional level
as a neutral and balanced set of rules,” and more than that, it is up to the law
note 37, at art. 116 IPRG-CH (only in employment contracts the choice is limited, art. 121(3)
IPRG-CH).
50. See Rome I, supra note 1, heading before art. 3.
51. Commentary on Art. 2(4) PCLIC, no. 2.14; Leible, supra note 40, at art 3 rec. 23 (2014).
52. Commentary on Art. 2(4) PCLIC, no. 2.15.
53. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (2)(a) (1971). See also Symeon C.
Symeonides, The Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts: Some Prelimi-
nary Comments, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 880 (2013).
54. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth
Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217 (2013), with one “rare” example in 2012 to the contrary.
55. Symeonides, supra note 15, at 513, 524. This is directly regulated by Rome I, supra note
11, at art. 3(3).
56. L.E. O’Hara & E. A. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1151, 1227 (2000); R ¨UHL, supra note 7, at 497; see generally Giesela Ru¨hl, Methods and
Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801, 814
(2006).
57. On the drafting process of this article, see Genevieve Saumier, The Hague Principles and
the Choice of Non-State ‘Rules of Law’ to Govern an International Commercial Contract, 40
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–18 (2014).
58. Pissler, supra note 38, at 10.
59. The draft of October 2012 only stated that “a reference to law includes rules of law.”
PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 2(1) § (2).
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of the forum to “provide[s] otherwise.”60 The last clause especially is a
concession to the large majority of states that do not allow their courts, as
opposed to arbitration panels,61 to base their decisions on non-state rules,62
such as in Japan63 or Switzerland.64 The option for contract parties to agree
on the basis of private international law on unwritten “general principles of
law” (usually the lex mercatoria) or even on certain written and publicized
sets of norms drafted by so-called “formulating agencies” (such as: the
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) developed by the Lando-
Group,65 the above-mentioned PICC of UNIDROIT,66 the Draft Common
Frame of Reference (DCFR) on European Private Law67 with the narrower
optional instrument based on it, the currently postponed Common European
Sales Law (CESL),68 and even the PCLIC itself), is for instance excluded
under Rome I. This is because following recital 13 of the Preamble, parties
are not precluded from incorporating “by reference into the[ir] contract a
non-State body of law or an international convention.” This means that the
parties may only integrate such rules into the contract on the basis of sub-
stantive law. In other words, parties must use their freedom to design the
content of the contract within a single legal order69 (the same “incorpora-
tion by reference” of non-state norms is possible under the U.S. Restate-
ment;70 a choice by means of private international law is only allowed in
Oregon and Louisiana71).
The two main arguments against choice of non-state rules are first, that
they are by no means complete or comprehensive—on the contrary, they
60. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 3. See Martiny, supra note 29, at 637; Pfeiffer, supra note
17, at 501, 504.
61. See Saumier, supra note 57, at 19.
62. Commentary on Art. 3 PCLIC, no. 3.14; Fauvarque-Cosson, supra note 29, at 463; see
Leible, supra note 40, at art. 3 Rome I-VO rec. 23.
63. See Yuko Nishitani, Party Autonomy and Its Restrictions by Mandatory Rules in Japa-
nese Private International Law: Contractual Conflicts Rules, in JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN PRI-
VATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 87 (Ju¨rgen Basedow ed., 2008);
Sakurada & Schwittek, supra note 39, at 93.
64. Marc Amstutz, Nedim Peter Vogt & Markus Wang, Art. 116 rec. 21 IPRG, in BASLER
KOMMENTAR: INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (Heinrich Honsell et. al eds., 2007).
65. Principles of European Contract Law 2002, http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.princi
ples.parts.1.to.3.2002/.
66. Supra note 2. Saumier, supra note 57, at 24, especially mentions the PICC together with
the CISG.
67. DCFR, supra note 2.
68. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law,
COM/2011/0635 final, amended by the European Parliament in its legislative resolution P7_TA
0159 (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do;jsessionid=B387E40B215
E3EE8C5A6BB621D73B3E5.node2?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT%20TA%20P7-TA-2014-0159%200%
20DOC%20XML%20V0//en.
69. Ragno, supra note 44, at art. 3 rec. 21; Girsberger, supra note 10, at 550.
70. Symeonides, supra note 15, at 513, 539.
71. R ¨UHL, supra note 7, at 489.
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are, almost necessarily, incomplete72—and second, that they are not legiti-
mized by a (more or less democratic) legislation process. The first argument
is not convincing at all, because even if the parties choose a state-made law
to be applicable to their contract, this “set of rules” only governs the
problems arising out of their contract itself, mostly regulated in the field of
substantive contract law (see the examples in Article 9 of the PCLIC on
interpretation, rights and obligation arising from the contract, performance
and the consequences of non-performance and so on), but not other aspects
of their contractual relationship, such as their capacity to conclude a con-
tract or the effects their contract has on their property.73 These parts of their
legal relationship are governed by different conflict of law rules, and some-
times there is no choice of law possible. Parties, especially those acting
commercially on an international basis, are normally aware that they have
to choose a fallback legal regime, which is recommended even by the draft-
ers of the Hague Principles.74 The second argument points to the problem of
rules introduced by one of the parties which are designed in the party’s
favor, like standard contract terms of business actors or contract forms de-
veloped by certain branches or industries. In contrast to such individual
rules, state-made law is normally seen as “neutral and balanced,” which is
one criterion required by Article 3 of the PCLIC. This problem seems to be
relevant, because if private rules can be chosen under private international
law, they cannot be controlled like standard contract terms integrated into
the contract by shaping the content of the agreement. It does not matter
whether there is an instrument to control such clauses in the chosen set of
rules, such as in Article II.-9:408 of the DCFR,75 because it can only be
applied to the conflict of law choice itself. From that it becomes clear that
the basic paradigm in conflict of laws, which states that all national laws
have to be generally seen as equal, irrelevant of their differences in content,
is shattered. Why are parties allowed “to use the contract rules of Burma
and not the rules of business organizations like the International Chamber
of Commerce?”76 Therefore some rule selection, like from those in Article
3 of the PCLIC, could be necessary. That may even be true for national
legal systems. The real problem in applying non-state rules of law is the
72. Ralf Michaels, Non-State Law in the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International
Contracts, in VARIETIES OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW AND REGULATION: LIBER AMICORUM
MICKLITZ 43, 63 (Kai Purnhagen & Peter Rott eds., 2014).
73. See the exemptions in Article 1 § (3) of the PCLIC supra note 25.
74. Commentary on Art. 3 PCLIC, no. 3.15. See also Michaels, supra note 72, at 60.
75. Instruments to control private contract clauses are not included in the Unidroit Principles,
except for the more general “gross disparity” in Art. 3.2.7 PICC, because there only the entry of
standard terms into the contract is controlled, Art. 2.1.19 PICC, and the special interpretation
contra proferentem in Art 4.6 PICC supra note 2.
76. Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States: Justifying
Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 426 (2008).
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lack of authoritative sources for interpretation,77 which leads to uncertainty.
But the more parties choose this soft law, the more court decisions become
available, leading to more predictability. Even from this perspective, in-
cluding non-state rules into the choice of law makes sense.78
In the end, the parties’ choice to opt for a “generally accepted”79 non-
state set of rules should be respected to foster party autonomy, because such
a choice may cause disadvantages only for the parties to bear, not for the
society.80 Additionally, the main difference as compared to incorporating
non-state rules into the contract by means of using the freedom to change
the default rules of the applied legislative model is rather small. A genuine
choice of law under private international law rules may avoid mandatory
provisions of any national legal order, but there are only very few of these
in commercial contract law—in contrast, for instance, to consumer con-
tracts or employment contracts, which are not within the scope of applica-
tion of the Hague Principles.81 The rare remaining principles are good faith
(which normally is contained in elaborated private set of rules),82 and the
ban on illegal or immoral agreements (which could more or less be handled
by using overriding mandatory principles and the public policy excep-
tion).83 In any case, the compromise solution in Article 3 of the PCLIC
(“. . . unless the law of the forum provides otherwise”) should be deleted
because it hinders the main goal of the Hague Principles—to harmonize
choice of law—and creates new uncertainty by enabling national legal or-
ders to ban non-state law.
B. Aspects of Better Predictability of Choice of Law
Predictability is one main goal in the area of conflict of laws84 because
actors should know in advance what law will be applied to a certain legal
relationship if it has to be judged by a court. From an economic point of
view, an efficient planning of actions is only possible if the consequences of
these actions, which are often determined by the law, are predictable. As
77. Saumier, supra note 57, at 26. On this problem in general, see Andreas Schwartze,
Europa¨isierung des Zivilrechts durch ‘soft law,’ in ¨OKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DER EUROP ¨AISCHEN
ZIVILRECHTSENTWICKLUNG 130, 153 (Thomas Eger & Hans B. Scha¨fer eds., 2007).
78. For a more critical discussion, see Michaels, supra note 72, at 65.
79. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 3. Cf. Max Planck Institute for Comparative and Interna-
tional Private Law, Comments on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome
I), 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT F ¨UR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATECHT 225, 241
(2007) (“The parties may also choose . . . the principles and body of rules . . . recognised interna-
tionally or in the Community.”).
80. R ¨UHL, supra note 7, at 493.
81. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
82. See U.N. Convention on Sales Contracts, supra note 19 at art. 7 § (1); PICC supra note 2
at art. 1.7.
83. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 11 §§ (1), (4). Supra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Ru¨hl, supra note 56, at 807.
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shown above, such legal certainty is rather difficult to achieve in the field of
conflict of laws. However, especially regarding contracts, choice of law is
seen as a way to have more reliability,85 if parties can be sure that the court
is applying the chosen law.
But the chosen law is only applied if the agreement about the choice of
law is valid, which may be disputable in the case of an implied or tacit
choice and where the choice is contained in standard contract terms.
1. Tacit Choice
To clarify under what circumstances an implied or tacit choice of law
is valid is not an easy task. Maybe this is the reason why, as a rare example,
in China, following section 3 of the PIL-Statute of 2011, only an express
choice of law is valid and an implied choice is not accepted.86 The Hague
Principles try to set a rather strict condition by requiring that the choice of
law has to “appear clearly from the provisions of the contract or the circum-
stances.”87 This is in contrast to Japan, where a tacit choice of law is ac-
cepted, but even in the new PIL-Act of 2007, no similar condition is laid
down.88 The wording of the PCLIC is mostly in line with the corresponding
conflict of laws rule of the E.U.,89 although Article 3(1) section 1 of Rome
I-Reg has a more procedural connotation90 because the choice has to be
“clearly demonstrated.” The inference drawn from the provisions of the
contract must be strong, but there is no fixed list of criteria in the Hague
Principles. The drafters give some examples for strong indications, such as
a standard form that is generally used in the context of a particular legal
system and terminology containing characteristics of a certain legal order or
references to national provisions.91 A choice of court clause is “not in itself
equivalent to a choice of law.”92 Rather, it is seen only as a weaker argu-
ment in favor of a choice of law of the forum state93 (following rec. 12 of
Rome I it at least “should be one of the [relevant] factors to be taken into
85. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2012: Twenty-Sixth
Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217 (2013); Ragno, supra note 44, at art. 3  rec. 3.
86. See Pissler, supra note 38, at 10.
87. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 4 sentence 1, second alternative.
88. Sakurada & Schwittek, supra note 39, at 96.
89. See commentary on Art. 4 PCLIC no. 4.2.
90. Jan L. Neels & Eesa A. Fredericks, Tacit Choice of Law in the Hague Principles on
Choice of Law in International Contracts, 44 DE JURE L. J. 101, 109 (2011) (referring to the
discussion in the Working Group drafting the Hague Principle).
91. See commentary on Art. 4 PCLIC no. 4.9, 4.10. The last example is found in China, in
the official interpretation laid down by the Supreme People’s court, thereby accepting an implied
choice of law. See Pissler, supra note 38, at 10. For other factors demonstrating an implied choice,
see INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL SALES LAW 4.18
(2012).
92. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 4 sentence 2.
93. See commentary on Art. 4 PCLIC no. 4.11. See Neels & Fredericks, supra note 90, at
107; Martiny, supra note 29, at 640. Favoring a substantial indication of a choice-of-forum clause
in Germany, see Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice] BGH from 13.06.1996 - IX ZR 172/
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account”), although it is usually in the interest of the parties to let the judge
apply a law with which he is familiar. Assuming a choice of law in such a
case, as was proposed at the beginning for the Rome I-Regulation, would
therefore be a better way to create predictability in this respect, stimulating
the parties to make it clear if they want to separate forum and applicable
law. Overall, the foreseeability of an implied choice of law following the
Hague Principles could be enhanced.
2. Choice via Standard Terms
Special problems arise if both parties use standard terms for their
choice of law and designate different laws but there are barely any relevant
provisions in the actual conflict of laws regulations. However, if only one
party uses standard contract terms with a choice of law clause or if both
parties opt for the same law, this hypothetical legal order decides whether
the choice of law is valid.94 This is seen as the most (transaction-)cost-
saving method, especially because the parties are able to concentrate on the
agreed law.95 In a battle of forms between the parties with contradictory
choice of law clauses, it first has to be decided how to identify the prevail-
ing contract term, because the national laws use at least four different meth-
ods for that (“first shot,” “last shot,” “knock out,” and hybrid solutions96). If
under both laws the same method is applied and therefore the same standard
terms prevail, the law designated in the terms shall decide if the choice of
law agreement is valid.97 But if the parties’ different preferred legal systems
use different methods and therefore in one system party A’s standard terms
and in the other system party B’s standard terms prevail (or if under one or
both of these laws no standard terms prevail), there shall be no choice of
law.98 This seems to be a rather complicated solution,99 but it is necessary.
Generally applying the increasingly relevant “knock out” rule, articulated
for instance in Article 2.1.22 of the PICC, would thwart even more choice
of law attempts,100 because under the knock out rule, there would be no
agreement in any case with conflicting options for the governing law.
95, in 49 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2569 (1996); UNALEX DATABASE supra note 11 at DE
1881.
94. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 6; see also similar Rome I-Reg, supra note 11, at art. 3(5),
art. 10(1), in contrast to Japan where usually the “lex fori” is applied; see also Sakurada & Schwit-
tek, supra note 39, at 95; R ¨UHL, supra note 7, at 477.
95. R ¨UHL, supra note 7, at 480.
96. For more detail, see Thomas Kadner Graziano, Solving the Riddle of Conflicting Choice
of Law Clauses in Battle of Form Situations: The Hague Solution, 15 Y.B. OF PRIVATE INT’L L.
71, 74–80 (2102/2013).
97. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 6(b) first half.
98. PCLIC, supra note 25, at art. 6(b) second half.
99. See criticism in Martiny, supra note 29, at 643.
100. See Kadner Graziano, supra note 96, at 100.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-1\UST110.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-JAN-16 8:49
2015] HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW 99
CONCLUSION
If the main goals of the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in Interna-
tional Contracts are to improve the possibilities of choice of law in com-
mercial contracts and at the same time to increase legal certainty, parties
should be free to agree on a certain applicable law—even during a court
procedure, if any additional costs for the court are bourne by the parties—
and their choice should not be limited to certain sets of rules, no matter if
they are state-made or private. To enhance the predictability of choice of
law, a rebuttable presumption in favor of implied agreements should be
introduced in certain situations, whereby the battle of contradicting choice
of law clauses can best be pacified with the proposed rule of the Hague
Principles.
Fostering such private autonomy by amending the Hague Principles on
Choice of Law in International Contracts or guiding its interpretation is
something Christian Kirchner would probably have strongly supported. We
should follow his path and try to convince the relevant actors with our argu-
ments. I think this presentation could be an example.
